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Abstract
Background: Although vaccination can be a useful tool for control of avian influenza epidemics, it might engender
emergence of a vaccine-resistant strain. Field and experimental studies show that some avian influenza strains acquire
resistance ability against vaccination. We investigated, in the context of the emergence of a vaccine-resistant strain, whether
a vaccination program can prevent the spread of infectious disease. We also investigated how losses from immunization by
vaccination imposed by the resistant strain affect the spread of the disease.
Methods and Findings: We designed and analyzed a deterministic compartment model illustrating transmission of vaccine-
sensitive and vaccine-resistant strains during a vaccination program. We investigated how the loss of protection
effectiveness impacts the program. Results show that a vaccination to prevent the spread of disease can instead spread the
disease when the resistant strain is less virulent than the sensitive strain. If the loss is high, the program does not prevent
the spread of the resistant strain despite a large prevalence rate of the program. The epidemic’s final size can be larger than
that before the vaccination program. We propose how to use poor vaccines, which have a large loss, to maximize program
effects and describe various program risks, which can be estimated using available epidemiological data.
Conclusions: We presented clear and simple concepts to elucidate vaccination program guidelines to avoid negative
program effects. Using our theory, monitoring the virulence of the resistant strain and investigating the loss caused by the
resistant strain better development of vaccination strategies is possible.
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Introduction
Highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza A viruses have spread
relentlessly across the globe since 2003. They are associated with
widespread death of poultry, substantial economic loss to farmers,
and reported infections of more than 300 people with a mortality
rate of 60% [1]. Influenza prevention and containment strategies
can be considered under the broad categories of antiviral, vaccine,
and non-pharmaceutical measures [2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13]. A
major public health concern is the next influenza pandemic; yet it
remains unclear how to control such a crisis.
Vaccination of domestic poultry against the H5N1 subtype of
avian influenza has been used in several countries such as Pakistan,
Hong Kong, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam [14,15,16]. Using
vaccination to reduce the transmission rate might provide an
alternative to mass culling, by reducing both the susceptibility of
healthy birds and the infectiousness of infected birds [14,17,18].
However, incomplete protection at the bird level can cause the
silent spread of the virus within and among birds [11].
Furthermore, vaccines might provide immunological pressure on
the circulating strains, which might engender the emergence of
drifted or shifted variants with enhanced potential for pathoge-
nicity in humans [1]. Therefore, although vaccination programs
have been recommended recently, some field evidence indicates
that vaccination alone will not achieve eradication. Moreover, if
not used appropriately, vaccination might result in the infection
becoming endemic [11,17].
An important issue related to influenza epidemics is the
potential for the emergence of vaccine-resistant influenza viruses.
The vaccine-resistant strain, in general, causes a loss of the
protection effectiveness of vaccination [19,20,21,22] (there is
experimental evidence of the loss of the protection effectiveness for
antiviral-resistant strains [23]). Consequently, a vaccination
program that engenders the emergence of the resistant strain
might promote the spread of the resistant strain and undermine
the control of the infectious disease, even if the vaccination
protects against the transmission of a vaccine-sensitive strain
[20,21,22].
For example, in China, despite a compulsory program for the
vaccination of all poultry commencing in September 2005, the
H5N1 influenza virus has caused outbreaks in poultry in 12
provinces from October 2005 to August 2006 [14,15,22]. Genetic
analysis revealed that an H5N1 influenza variant (Fujian-like, FJ
like), which is a previously uncharacterized H5N1 virus subline-
age, had emerged and subsequently became the prevalent variant
in each of the provinces, replacing those previously established
multiple sublineages in different regions of southern China. Some
data suggest that the poultry vaccine currently used in China
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viruses (seroconversion rates remain low and vaccinated birds are
poorly immunized against FJ-like viruses) in comparison to other
previously cocirculating H5N1 sublineages [20,22]. That evidence
implies the possibility that the emergence and replacement of FJ-
like virus was preceded by and facilitated by the vaccination
program, although the mechanism remains unknown epidemio-
logically and virologically (some researchers consider that the
emergence and replacement of FJ-like virus are questionable
[24,25]).
Furthermore, the H5N2 vaccines have been used in Mexico
since 1995 [17,19,21]. Phylogenetic analysis suggests the presence
of (previously uncharacterized) multiple sublineages of Mexican
lineage isolates which emerged after the introduction of the
vaccine. Vaccine protection studies further confirmed in vitro
serologic results indicating that commercial vaccine was not able
to prevent virus shedding when chickens were challenged with the
multiple sublineage isolates [19,21]. Therefore, the vaccine
protective efficacy would be impaired and the use of this specific
vaccine would eventually become obsolete. That fact also implies
that the vaccine promotes the selection of mutation in the
circulating virus.
The emergence of a vaccine-resistant strain presents the risk of
generating a new pandemic virus that is dangerous for humans
through an avian-human link because of the spread of vaccine-
resistant strain. The dynamics of competition between vaccine-
sensitive and vaccine-resistant strains is, in general, complex [8,9].
Actually, outcomes of the dynamics might be influenced by several
factors, including a loss of protection effectiveness, a competitive
advantage of vaccine-resistant strain, and a prevalence rate of
vaccination. Understanding the dynamics of a spread of vaccine-
resistant is therefore crucial for implementation of effective
mitigation strategies.
Several theoretical studies have investigated the impact of an
emergence of a resistant strain of antiviral drug such as M2
inhibitors and NA inhibitors during an influenza pandemic among
humans [2,3,8,9,10,12,26]. However, to our knowledge, no study
has used a mathematical model to investigate the application of
vaccination program among poultry in the context of an
emergence of a vaccine-resistant strain. It remains unclear whether
a vaccination program can prevent the spread of infectious disease
when the vaccine-resistant strain emerges and how a loss of
immunization by vaccination within birds infected with the
vaccine-resistant strain affects the spread of infectious disease
among birds. Nobody can give a simple and clear explanation to
capture the problems described above in a theoretical framework
(using numerical simulations, many qualitative and quantitative
but sometimes very complex studies have investigated effects of
antiviral drugs [3,8,9,10,12,26]). Furthermore, we remain skeptical
that a vaccination program can reduce the number of total
infectious individuals even if the vaccination protects against
transmission of a vaccine-sensitive strain. We developed a simple
mathematical model to evaluate the effectiveness, as a strategy to
control influenza epidemic, of a vaccination program among
poultry which can engender the emergence of a vaccine-resistant
strain.
Methods
Herein, we describe a homogeneous population model of
infectious disease and its control using a vaccination program in
the presence of a vaccine-resistant strain (Fig. 1).
All birds in the effective population are divided into several
compartments, respectively including susceptible birds (X), vacci-
nated birds (V), birds infected with vaccine-sensitive strain (Y), and
birds infected with vaccine-resistant strain (Z). We assume that
susceptible birds are born or restocked at a rate of c per day and
that all birds are naturally dead or removed from the effective
population at a rate of b per day.
In the absence of vaccination, transmission occurs at a rate that
is directly related to the number of infectious birds, with respective
transmission rate constants v and w from infected birds with the
vaccine-sensitive strain and with the vaccine-resistant strain. The
infectiousness of vaccine-sensitive and vaccine-resistant strain are
assumed to be exponentially distributed, respectively, with mean
durations of 1/(b+my) and 1/(b+mz) days. Actually, my and mz
respectively signify virulence of vaccine-sensitive and vaccine-
resistant strains.
At the beginning of the vaccination program, X moves directly
to V by the vaccination. However, after some period after the
initial vaccination, the direct movement might vanish because
almost all birds are vaccinated. Therefore, we can assume that
vaccination is only administered to the newly hatched birds. The
newly hatched birds are vaccinated at the rate 0#p#1 (more
appropriately, p is proportional). Actually, p represents the
prevalence rate of the vaccination program.
To simplify the theoretical treatment, as described in [11], we
assume that the vaccinated birds can be protected completely from
the vaccine-sensitive strain (note that the assumption is not
necessary for our results: see Supplementary Information: Text S1,
Fig. S10, S11). Actually, in laboratory experience, many avian
influenza vaccines confer a very high level of protection against
clinical signs and mortality (90–100% protected birds) [21].
However, many factors determine whether a vaccinated bird
becomes infected, including age, species, challenge dose, health,
antibody titre, infections of immunosuppressive diseases, and
cross-reactivity of other avian influenza serotypes [11,27,28,29].
On the other hand, we assume that the vaccinated birds are
Figure 1. Model structure for the emergence of vaccine-
resistant strain during a vaccination program: Susceptible
birds (X) become infected with vaccine-sensitive (Y)a n d
vaccine-resistant (Z) strains at rates in direct relation to the
number of respective infectious birds. We assume that vaccinated
birds (V) can be protected completely from the vaccine-sensitive strain,
but are partially protected from vaccine-resistant strains with a loss of
protection effectiveness of the vaccination (s). See the Mathematical
model section for corresponding equations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004915.g001
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(proportion) 0#12s#1 because of cross-reactivity of immune
systems [19,20,22,23,29] (e.g., s=0 represents complete cross
immunity against vaccine-resistant strains). Actually, s represents
a loss of protection effectiveness of the vaccination caused by a
vaccine-resistant strain.
Mathematical model
We extended the standard susceptible–infective model [30]
including the effect of a vaccination program that can engender
the emergence of a vaccine-resistant strain. Our mathematical
model is given by the following equations:
X’~ 1{p ðÞ c{bX{ vYzwZ ðÞ X,
V’~pc{bV{swZV,
Y’~vYX{ bzmy ðÞ Y,
Z’~wZX zsV ðÞ { bzmz ðÞ Z:
ð1Þ
Model (1) is a simplified one that is used in [31]. We considered a
mechanism for the emergence and replacement of the FJ-like virus
over a large geographical region in China using a more complex
patch-structured model in the heterogeneous area [31]. Here we
investigate the impact of the vaccination program in a homoge-
neous area and specifically examine the role of epidemiological
parameters such as the prevalence rate of the vaccination program
(p) and the loss of protection effectiveness of the vaccination (s)i n
the spread of the disease.
Estimation of epidemiological parameters
Baseline values of model parameters and their respective ranges
used for simulations are presented in Table 1 and 2. These
parameters are based on avian influenza epidemics among poultry
in The Netherlands in 2003 [32,33,34].
The initial population size was c/b=984 birds at the 2003
epidemic [34]. Usually, the mean lifespan of poultry is about 2
years. However, we assume that the mean duration of a bird being
in effective population is about 1/b=100 days because of
migration and marketing. Therefore, the birth or restocking rate
of birds is c=9.84 birds per day. Estimated infectious period and
transmission parameters are 1/(b+my)=13.8 days and
v=4.78610
24 day
21 individual
21, respectively, [34]. These
physical characteristics, in addition to infectious and transmission
parameters, are used in our model as parameters of the vaccine-
sensitive strain.
The epidemiological and biological feature of antiviral drug-
resistance is well reported in [23]. The transmissibility and
virulence of drug-resistant strains are usually lower than those of
the wild strain because of its mutation cost [8,10,23,35]. Actually,
antiviral drugs are also used for prophylaxis drug intervention as
vaccination [8,10,12]. Herein, we use some reduced value of
transmissibility (w/v=0.58) and the increased value of infectious
period of the vaccine-sensitive strain ((b+my)/(b+mz)=1.32) for
parameters of vaccine-resistant strain (sensitivity analyses are given
in Supplementary Information: Text S1, Fig. S6, S7, S8, S9).
Reproductive numbers
A measure of transmissibility and of the stringency of control
policies necessary to stop an epidemic is the basic reproductive
number, which is the number of secondary cases produced by each
primary case [30]. We obtain basic reproductive quantities of
vaccine-sensitive strain Rns and vaccine-resistant strain Rnr before
vaccination program (superscript n means no vaccination). In fact,
during the vaccination program, the basic reproductive numbers
depend on the rate of prevalence of the vaccination program. We
Table 1. Description of physical characteristics, transmission, infectious, and vaccination parameters of the model with their
baseline values and ranges used for simulations.
Symbol Description Value (Range) Reference
c/b Initial bird population size 984 birds [34]
1/(b+my) Mean infectious period of V-S strain 13.8 days [34,36]
v Transmissibility of V-S strain 4.78610
24 day
21 individual
21 [34]
(b+my)/(b+mz) Relative mean infectious period of V-R strain 1.32 [10,12,23]
Q/v Relative transmissibility of V-R strain 0.58 [10,12,23]
s Loss of vaccine effectiveness by V-R strain Variable (0–1) –
p Prevalence rate of vaccination program Variable (0–1) –
These parameters are based on avian influenza epidemics in The Netherlands in 2003 [32,33,34]. Actually, V-S and V-R represent ‘‘vaccine-sensitive’’ and ‘‘vaccine-
resistant’’, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004915.t001
Table 2. Basic reproductive numbers and invasion reproductive numbers before the vaccination program.
Symbol Description Value Reference
Rns Basic reproductive numbers of vaccine-sensitive strain 6.53 [34,36]
Rnr Basic reproductive number of vaccine-resistant strain 4.99 [10,12,23]
R
nr Invasion reproductive number of vaccine-resistant strain 0.76 –
These values are based on the H7N7 epidemic in The Netherlands in 2003 [32,33,34]. The exact expressions of these reproductive numbers are given in Supplementary
Information: Text S1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004915.t002
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prevalence rate in Supplementary Information: Text S1. With the
estimated parameters in Table 1 the basic reproductive number of
vaccine-sensitive and vaccine-resistant strain are Rns~6:53 and
Rnr~4:99, respectively (note that Rns corresponds to an estimated
value in [34]).
Furthermore, to clarify the concept of competition among
strains simply, we introduce the invasion reproductive number for
the vaccine-resistant strain before the vaccination program R
nr,
which signifies an expected number of new infectious cases with
the vaccine-resistant strain after a spread of a vaccine-sensitive
strain among birds. The invasion reproductive number is
considered as a competitive condition (relative fitness), which
represents some advantage measure of the vaccine-resistant strain
against the vaccine-sensitive strain. The estimated invasion
reproductive number of the vaccine-resistant strain is R
nr
~0:76.
During the vaccination program, the invasion reproductive
number also depends on the prevalence rate of the vaccination
program (see Supplementary Information: Text S1).
Results
We consider a scenario in which a vaccine-resistant strain can
emerge (i.e., be eventually selected) during a vaccination program
designed to be effective against the spread of a vaccine-sensitive
strain. This implies that Rnrw1: otherwise the vaccine-resistant
strain can not emerge at all (see Supplementary Information: Text
S1, Fig. S1, S2, S3). Acquisition of resistance ability usually
engenders a strain which, in the absence of a pharmaceutical
intervention, is less fit than the sensitive strain [8,9,12,35].
Therefore, RnrvRns. We generally assume the following condi-
tions for reproductive numbers before the vaccination program
(our baseline parameter values are satisfied with these assump-
tions):
Rnsw1, Rnrw1, R
nrv1:
The assumption precludes the possibility that a pre-existing
vaccine-resistant strain beats the vaccine-sensitive strain before the
vaccination program because R
nrv1.
Evaluation of the effect of a vaccination program
Although vaccination is an important tool to control epidemics,
the use of vaccination might engender a spread of a vaccine-
resistant strain. To demonstrate the interplay between these
opposing effects, we simulated our model to determine the final
size of an epidemic (total infected individuals Y+Z at equilibrium
level) over vaccination prevalence (0#p#1) in Fig. 2 (we use our
baseline parameter values except for mz). We assume that the loss
of the protection effectiveness is 35% (s=0.35: this value can be
chosen arbitrarily with little effect on the meaning of the results).
The estimated infectious period of the vaccine-sensitive strain is
13.8 days [34] (see Table 1). Therefore, the virulence of vaccine-
sensitive strain is my=0.062 day
21. Results show that the patterns
of the final size can be divided into two cases, which depend
strongly on the virulence of the vaccine-resistant strain. If the
virulence of the vaccine-resistant strain is lower than that of
vaccine-sensitive strain (e.g., we choose mz=0.045), then increas-
ing the prevalence rate of vaccination from 13.5% to 30.3% can
increase the final size (green line at top figure in Fig. 2). On the
other hand, if the virulence is higher (mz=0.065), increasing the
prevalence always decreases the final size (bottom figure in Fig. 2).
These two patterns are qualitatively preserved for different
virulence of the vaccine-resistant strain.
In [8,9], although they consider the emergence of an antiviral
drug-resistant virus, a similar tendency (increasing the treatment level
increases the final size of the epidemic) was obtained through
complex models that are difficult to treat mathematically. The
mathematical model presented herein demonstrates that the patterns
of final size over vaccination prevalence only depend on the virulence
of the vaccine-resistant strain as follows (see Supplementary
Information: Text S1). Increasing the prevalence rate increases the
final size when only both strains co-exist if the virulence of vaccine-
resistant strain is lower than that of vaccine-sensitive strain (my.mz).
That is to say, the vaccination is effective when either a vaccine-
sensitive or a vaccine-resistant strain exists. On the other hand, if the
virulence of vaccine-resistant strain is higher than that of vaccine-
sensitive strain (my,mz), the final size always decreases as the
Figure 2. Final size of epidemics related with the prevalence
rate of the vaccination: The top figure represents that the
vaccination is not always effective in the case of lower
virulence of vaccine-resistant strain. The bottom figure represents
that the vaccination is always effective in the case of higher virulence of
the vaccine-resistant strain. We assume that s=0.35, mz=0.045 (top)
and mz=0.065 (bottom). These values of s and mz are not so influential
on the result. The blue, green, and red lines respectively signify
situations in which only the vaccine-sensitive strain exists, both the
vaccine-sensitive and the vaccine-resistant strains exist, and only the
vaccine-resistant strain exists.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004915.g002
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patterns. In fact, many studies have ignored the impact of the
virulence of the vaccine-resistant strain. In [7], we also found that the
virulence of mutant strain determines a choice of the optimal
prevention policy for avian influenza epidemic. Therefore, we suggest
that, to monitor and investigate the virulence evolution between the
vaccine-sensitive and vaccine-resistant strain is important to develop
avian flu epidemic plans. In fact, if the vaccine-resistant strain has
higher virulence than the vaccine-sensitive strain, the vaccination
program is always effective, even though the program engenders the
emergence of a vaccine-resistant strain. On the other hand, if the
vaccine-resistant strain has lower virulence, we must carefully
manage vaccination to prevent the spread of a vaccine-resistant
strain.
Impact of loss of protection effectiveness of vaccination
To ensure an effective vaccination program, the vaccine must
protect vaccinated animals against clinical signs of the disease and
prevent mortality [21]. However, the vaccine-resistant strain causes
a loss of the protection effectiveness of the vaccination
[19,20,21,22,37]. We investigate an impact of the loss of the
protection on change of final size of the epidemic over the
vaccination prevalence. Assume, hereafter, that the virulence of
vaccine-resistant strain is lower than that of vaccine-sensitive strain
(my.mz): otherwise, the vaccination is always effective (our baseline
parameter values are satisfied with my.mz). Actually, a resistant
strain seems to have reduced virulence in general [8,10,23,35].
We conduct a simulation using our model to elucidate the
change of the final size with the loss of the protection effectiveness
5%, 15%, and 80% over vaccination prevalence in Fig. 3. Results
showed that the patterns of the change are divisible into three
cases. In theory, we can estimate the threshold values of the loss of
the protection which determines the patterns (see Supplementary
Information: Text S1, Fig. S4):
s ~ R
ns
{1
 
Rns{1 ðÞ , s~1=Rnr:
In fact, s
*=0.056 and s~0:200 in our simulation from Table 1.
When the loss of the protection is between 0% and s
*=5.6% (5%:
the top figure in Fig. 3), the vaccination can control the epidemic
with the prevalence rate of 84.7% without the emergence of a
resistant strain (a vaccine-resistant strain never emerges in the
population). Therefore, increasing the prevalence rate of vaccina-
tion always decreases the final size of the epidemic. For the loss of
the protection is between s
*=5.6% and s~20:1% (15%: the
middle figure in Fig. 3), the vaccination eventually prevents the
spread of the disease with 94.1% of vaccination prevalence in spite
of the emergence of the resistant strain. Increasing the prevalence
rate from 31.5% to 44.1% increases the final size. Therefore, the
vaccination is not always effective. However, when the loss of the
protection is between s~20:1% and 100% (80%: the bottom
figure in Fig. 3), the vaccination no longer controls the disease
(even if the prevalence rate is 100%) and the vaccine-resistant
strain spreads widely through the population instead of the
vaccine-sensitive strain. In this case, the vaccination only slightly
provides beneficial effects for preventing the spread of the disease.
Therefore, the loss of the protection effectiveness of vaccination
plays an important role in preventing the spread of the disease.
Vaccination can facilitate spread of disease
Sometimes a considerable spread of the resistant strain partially
compromises the benefits of a vaccination program [19,20,22,37].
Figure 3. Impact of the loss of the protection effectiveness of
the vaccination on the change of the final size of the epidemic:
The losses of the protection in the top, middle, and bottom
figure are s=0.05, 0.15, and 0.8, respectively. The top (0#s#s
*)
and middle (s ƒsƒs) figures portray the possibility of eradication of
the infectious disease through the vaccination program. However, in
the bottom figure (sƒsƒ1), the vaccination engenders a failure to
prevent the spread of the disease. The patterns of the change are
divisible into these three cases, depending on the loss of the protection.
The blue, green, and red lines respectively correspond to the situation
in which only the vaccine-sensitive strain exists, both the vaccine-
sensitive and the vaccine-resistant strains exist, and only the vaccine-
resistant strain exists.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004915.g003
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program (p=1), the final size of the epidemic can become larger
than that before the vaccination program (p=0) by the emergence
of vaccine-resistant strain (bottom figure in Fig. 3). This implies
that the vaccination, which is expected to prevent the spread of the
disease, can instead help the spread of the disease. If the loss of the
protection effectiveness of vaccination is high (s
*#s#1), the
vaccination might increase the final size over vaccination
prevalence compared with that before the vaccination program
(vaccination always decreases the final size if 0#s#s
* (top figure
in Fig. 3)). Here we can also calculate such a risk of help, which
depends on the loss of the protection (see Supplementary
Information: Text S1). Let
~ s s~ v R
nr
{1
  
w Rns{1 ðÞ {v Rnr{R
nr  
, sc~min ~ s s,1 fg :
Actually, sc=0.236 in our simulation is from Table 1. When
the loss of the protection is between 23.6% and 100%, we found
that the vaccination program is attended by the risk that the final
size becomes larger than that before the vaccination program (see
Supplementary Information: Text S1).
Difficulty of prediction of a prevalent strain
Vaccination is well known to engender ‘‘silent carriers or
excretors’’ if the vaccine can not completely protect the vaccinated
animals against clinical signs of the disease [16,21]. The existence
of silent carriers or excretors is dangerous because they become a
virus reservoir and shed the virus into their environment, causing
potential outbreaks among their own and other species. Further-
more, even if a vaccination is effective in a bird (individual level),
an incomplete vaccination program for all birds (population level)
can engender the ‘‘silent spread’’ of an infectious disease [1,11].
Additionally, we found that it is difficult for us to predict a
prevalent strain even if we can completely estimate the basic
reproductive number of vaccine-sensitive and vaccine-resistant
strains during the vaccination program (although estimations,
usually, are almost impossible). Even when the basic reproductive
number of the vaccine-resistant strain is less than that of the
vaccine-sensitive strain (RirvRis), the vaccine-resistant strain can
beat the vaccine-sensitive strain and spread widely through the
population (see Supplementary Information: Text S1, Fig. S5).
Therefore, a non-ideal vaccination program might make a
prediction of prevalent strain difficult.
Optimal prevalence rate of vaccination program
In the absence of a vaccine-resistant strain, a goal of vaccination
program is to reduce the basic reproductive number of vaccine-
sensitive strain Ris to be less than 1. We assume that Rns~6:53.
Therefore, the vaccination can eradicate the vaccine-sensitive
strain if at least 84.7% of the birds in poultry are vaccinated
effectively based on the fraction of 1{1=Rns [30]. However, in the
presence of the resistant strain, the simple theory is inapplicable to
an optimal prevalence rate of vaccination program. Here we
define the optimal prevalence rate of a vaccination program which
minimizes both the final size of the epidemic and the prevalence
rate (see Supplementary Information: Text S1).
We calculate the optimal prevalence rate, which depends on the
loss of the protection effectiveness of the vaccination in Fig. 4
(sensitivity analyses are given in Supplementary Information: Text
S1, Fig. S6). At the point where the loss of the protection
effectiveness is greater than some threshold value so, the optimal
prevalence rate changes catastrophically from high prevalence rate
to a low prevalence rate. Here
so~ wR
ns{w{v
 
wRns{w{vRnr ðÞ :
Actually, so=0.461 in our simulation from Table 1. The
optimal prevalence rate is 84.6% when the loss of the protection
effectiveness is between 0% and 5.6%. In addition, if the loss rate
is between 5.6% and 20.1%, then the optimal prevalence rate
increases from 84.6% to 100%. Furthermore, if the loss rate is
between 20.1% and 46.1%, then the optimal prevalence rate must
always be 100%. Consequently, as long as the loss of the
protection effectiveness is small (0%–46.1%), the loss can be
compensated by a high optimal prevalence rate of the vaccination
program. However, if the loss rate is greater than 46.1%, the loss is
no longer compensated by the high prevalence rate of the
vaccination program. The optimal prevalence rate changes
catastrophically from 100% to 10.2%. Afterward, as the loss rate
increases from 46.1% to 100%, the optimal prevalence rate
decreases from 10.2% to 4.72% (the low prevalence rate becomes
optimal). This is true because the poor vaccine (with a large loss of
the protection) engenders the emergence of the vaccine-resistant
strain for the high prevalence rate; in addition, the spread of the
resistant strain increases the final size of the epidemic. Therefore,
the loss of the protection effectiveness strongly impacts also on the
optimal prevalence rate.
Figure 4. Optimal prevalence rate of vaccination program:
Increasing of the loss of the protection effectiveness engen-
ders a catastrophic change in the optimal prevalence rate. The
optimal rate increases as the loss increases if the loss of the protection
effectiveness is small (0#s#so). This implies that a small loss of the
protection effectiveness can be compensated by a high optimal
prevalence rate of the vaccination program. On the other hand, if the
loss is large (so#s#1), the optimal rate decreases as the loss of the
protection effectiveness increases. This eventuality implies that a large
loss of the protection effectiveness is no longer compensated by the
high optimal prevalence rate of the vaccination program. Therefore, a
low prevalence rate, which does not engender the emergence of a
vaccine-resistant strain becomes optimal because the poor vaccine
engenders the increase of final size of the epidemic because of the
spread of the resistant strain.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004915.g004
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vaccination program
In countries where poultry are mainly backyard scavengers,
optimum vaccination coverage might be difficult to achieve [21].
The final size of the epidemic might be increased and the program
might fail if the optimal prevalence rate of the vaccination
program can not be achieved. However, if we can achieve
optimum vaccination coverage, the final size is greatly reduced.
The final size of the epidemics can be variable depending on the
prevalence rate. Here we calculate the optimal (smallest) and worst
(largest) final size of the epidemic over the vaccination prevalence
(see Supplementary Information: Text S1) in Fig. 5 (black and
yellow bars respectively represent the optimal and worst final size).
The variation of the final size is between black and yellow bars
shown in Fig. 5 (sensitivity analyses are given in Supplementary
Information: Text S1, Fig. S7).
If the loss of protection effectiveness is small, then the variation
is very large. The vaccination program can eradicate the disease or
reduce the final size of the epidemic to a very small size if we can
execute the vaccination program near the optimal prevalence rate.
The variation is sensitive for the prevalence rate. Therefore, we
must carefully manage the vaccination program to control the
disease when the loss is small. However, as the loss of protection
effectiveness increases, the variation decreases. In particular, when
the loss is medium, the reduction of the variation is remarkable. In
addition, the reduction of the variation remains almost unchanged
when the loss is large. This implies that the variation becomes
insensitive if the loss is high. In this case, even if we can execute the
vaccination program near the optimal prevalence rate, the effect of
the program is not large. Therefore, although the final size is
strongly affected by the vaccination coverage and a non-optimal
vaccination program (far from the optimal prevalence rate)
increases the final size, in general, good vaccine treatment with
small loss of protection effectiveness has a great possibility for
disease control. Demonstrably, poor vaccine application has little
or no benefit.
Effects of non-pharmaceutical intervention
Avian influenza vaccination need not be used alone to eradicate
the disease: additional non-pharmaceutical intervention is bene-
ficial. Additional interventions must include culling infected
animals, strict quarantine, movement controls and increased
biosecurity, extensive surveillance [11,16,21,34,37]. We investi-
gate the effects of some additional non-pharmaceutical interven-
tion measures on the vaccination program. The effects are
considered by changing model parameters (1).
In the European Union (EU), regulations for the control of
avian influenza strains are imposed by EU council directive 92/
40/EEC [34]. Virus output is reduced by the killing and removal
of infected poultry flocks (culling). During the H7N7 epidemic in
The Netherlands in 2003, this and other approaches were
executed. To investigate the effectiveness of the control measures,
A. Stegeman et al. quantified the transmission characteristics of the
H7N7 strain before and after detection of the first outbreak of
avian influenza in The Netherlands in 2003 [34]. In Table 1, we
present the chosen epidemiological parameters, which are
estimated on the H7N7 epidemic before notification of the
circulation of the avian influenza (these parameters are not
affected by the additional control measures). Here we choose other
epidemiological parameters for vaccine-sensitive strain which are
estimated by the H7N7 epidemic after the notification in [34]
(these parameters are affected by the additional control measures)
to evaluate an effect of the non-pharmaceutical intervention on the
vaccination program. The estimate of the transmission parameter
v decreases considerably from 4.78610
24 day
21 individual
21 to
1.70610
24 day
21 individual
21 by the control measures. Further-
more, the estimate of the infectious period 1/(b+my) is also reduced
from 13.8 days to 7.3 days. Therefore, control measures can
reduce the basic reproductive number Rns from 6.53 to 1.22 [34].
In addition, we assume, for example, that the relative transmis-
sibility of vaccine-resistant strains is w/v=0.7 and that the relative
infectious period of vaccine-resistant strain is (b+my)/(b+mz)=1.32
(these values are not strongly influential on our results).
We calculated the threshold values of the loss of protection
effectiveness of the vaccination and present them in Table 3 when
the vaccination program accompanies non-pharmaceutical inter-
vention. Results show that the non-pharmaceutical intervention
markedly reduces the risk of the emergence of the vaccine-resistant
strain because s
* changes from 5.6% to 37.2%. In addition, the
possibility that the vaccination program eventually eradicates the
spread of the disease increases because s changes from 20.1% to
88.6%. Furthermore, because sc changes from 23.6% to 100%,
the vaccination program always decreases the final size of the
Figure 5. Variation of the final size of the epidemic over the
vaccination prevalence: The black bar represents the optimal
(smallest) final size of the epidemic. The yellow bar represents the
worst (largest) final size of the epidemic over the vaccination
prevalence. The variation of the final size depending on the prevalence
rate is between black and yellow bars. If the loss of protection
effectiveness is small, then the variation is very large. On the other
hand, if the loss becomes large, then the variation decreases. Therefore,
the final size of the epidemic is strongly affected by the vaccination
coverage and the loss of protection effectiveness: a bad vaccination
program (far from the optimal prevalence rate) increases the final size
and prevents eradication of the disease.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004915.g005
Table 3. Threshold values of the loss of protection
effectiveness of the vaccination.
Loss of protection effectiveness Threshold values
s
* s sc so
Before notification of avian influenza 5.6% 20.1% 23.6% 46.1%
After notification of avian influenza 37.2% 88.6% 100% 96.8%
These values are calculated using parameters based on the H7N7 epidemic in
The Netherlands in 2003 before and after notification of avian influenza [34].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004915.t003
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even if the size increases when both strains co-exist. When the
vaccination program accompanies non-pharmaceutical interven-
tion, even if the loss of protection effectiveness is increased
considerably by the vaccine-resistant strain, the loss can almost be
compensated by the high optimal prevalence rate of the
vaccination program: so changes from 46.1% to 96.8%.
Figure 6 portrays the optimal prevalence rate of a vaccination
program (top figure) and the optimal final size of the epidemic
(bottom figure) with (pink curve and bar) or without (black curve
and bar) the non-pharmaceutical intervention. The non-pharma-
ceutical intervention makes it easy to achieve an optimal
prevalence rate and to prevent the spread of the disease.
Moreover, catastrophic change does not occur until the loss of
protection effectiveness becomes very high (top figure in Fig. 6).
Furthermore, the optimal final size is also dramatically reduced by
the additional intervention (bottom figure in Fig. 6). Even if
vaccination without the additional intervention can not prevent
the spread of the disease, the vaccination with the intervention can
eradicate the disease (for example s=60%). Therefore, non-
pharmaceutical intervention improves weak points of vaccination
programs such as the difficult control of optimal vaccination
coverage, the small applicability of the program with respect to the
loss of protection effectiveness caused by the vaccine-resistant
strain, and so on.
Time-course of the spread of the disease
Finally, we investigate the time-course of spread of the disease
according to vaccination and non-pharmaceutical interventions
for 500 days in the presence of a vaccine-resistant strain. The
results are presented in Fig. 7. We consider that the vaccination
program and non-pharmaceutical interventions are executed after
the vaccine-sensitive strain spreads and becomes endemic (around
200 days). Furthermore, the vaccine-resistant strain is assumed to
occur in a few individuals after the start of the vaccination
program (around 260 days). We assume that the prevalence rate of
the vaccination program is p=50%, the loss of protection
effectiveness is s=80%; the other parameters are the same as
those used in the descriptions above. These values of p and s are
not influential on our results (sensitivity analyses are shown in
Supplementary Information: Text S1, Fig. S8, S9).
The top figure in Fig. 7 depicts the epidemic curve without the
vaccination program. It is apparent that the vaccine-sensitive strain
(the blue curve) becomes endemic at around 200 days after a
pandemic phase of the disease if we execute no intervention policy.
The middle figure portrays the time-course of spread of the disease,
assuming the vaccination program alone. A vaccine-resistant strain
(the red curve) emerges and spreads widely through the population
by replacing the vaccine-sensitive strain. It becomes endemic at
around 450 days. This result shows the possibility that the
emergence and replacement of the resistant strain can be facilitated
by the vaccination program, as in some vaccination programs
[19,21,22]. We can observe that it takes about several months for
the resistant strain to beat the sensitive strain (see the middle figure
in Fig. 7). Actually, the replacement time of the resistant strain was
reported as several months in the China and Mexico epidemics
[19,21,22]. The final size of the simulated epidemic is larger than
that before (without) the vaccination program because the loss of
protectioneffectivenesss=80% is greaterthan s~20% (see Fig.3).
In this case, the vaccination program negatively affects the control
of infectious disease. The bottom figure presents the time-course of
the spread of the disease with both the vaccination program and
non-pharmaceutical interventions. The vaccine-sensitive strain is
dramatically reduced and the vaccine-resistant strain hardly spreads
inthepopulation;therefore,both strainsareeventuallycontrolledat
a low level by the interventions. Thus, non-pharmaceutical
interventions can help the vaccination program and control the
resistant strain to spread in the population.
Discussion
A serious problem of vaccination strategy is the emergence of
vaccine-resistant strains [19,20,21,22]. Even if a resistant strain
emerges, a vaccination program must be managed to control the
spread of the disease. In the absence of the resistant strain, our
mathematical model certainly shows that a large prevalence of the
vaccination program might markedly reduce an epidemic curve
and the final size of the epidemic. Therefore, we can control
infectious diseases as in previous models [30]. However, in the
presence of the emergence of a vaccine-resistant strain, the
vaccination program can not simply control the spread of the
disease. The control of the infectious disease through vaccination
becomes more difficult.
Figure 6. Effects of non-pharmaceutical intervention: The top
figure shows the optimal prevalence rate of the vaccination
program with (pink curve) or without (black curve) non-
pharmaceutical intervention. The non-pharmaceutical intervention
readily achieves the optimal prevalence rate and hinders the
catastrophic change. The bottom figure shows the optimal final size
of the epidemic with (pink bar) or without (black bar) the non-
pharmaceutical intervention. The intervention also dramatically reduces
the final size of the epidemic.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004915.g006
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vaccine-resistant strain is less than that of vaccine-sensitive strain,
thefinal sizeof the epidemic mightincrease astheprevalence rate of
the vaccination program increases (see Fig. 2). A vaccination that is
expected to prevent the spread of the disease can instead foster the
spread of the disease. Although qualitatively similar results were
obtained through more complex models [8,9], which can be treated
analytically only to a slight degree, one of our important results is
the clear and simple concept illustrating the value and pitfalls of
vaccination programs; the concept can help farmers and adminis-
trators to avoid negative effects from paradoxical phenomena.
We investigated how the loss of protection effectiveness impacts a
vaccination program’s results in the lower virulence case. If the loss
of protection effectiveness is between 0 and s, the vaccination
program can eventually eradicate the disease, even if a vaccine-
resistant strain emerges (see Fig. 3). In particular, if the loss is
between 0 and s
*, the program prevents even the emergence of the
resistant strain. However, when the loss is greater than s,t h e
program no longer prevents the widespread of the resistant strain in
spite ofthe largeprevalencerate oftheprogram.Furthermore,ifthe
loss is between sc and 1, the program presents the risk that the final
size will become larger than that without the vaccination program.
Therefore, in the context of the emergenceof the resistant strain,we
must carefully execute the program to exercise a positive effect of
the vaccine effectively. Additionally, we investigated the optimal
prevalence rate of the vaccination program, its final size, and the
worst-case final size (see Fig. 4, 5 and Supplementary Information:
Text S1). The catastrophic change of the optimal prevalence rate
and the variation of the final sizedepending on the lossof protection
effectiveness were confirmed.
From our theoretical analysis, we propose that monitoring the
virulence of the resistant strain and investigating the loss resulting
from a resistant strain can have important consequences for
developing a vaccination strategy. In particular, all thresholds
derived herein are only constructed using basic reproductive
numbers and transmissibilities that prevail before the vaccination
program, which can be estimated using epidemiological data (it is
usually almost impossible to estimate basic and invasion reproduc-
tive numbers during vaccination programs). Therefore, using our
theory, we were able to calculate various risks in the vaccination
program using the available data (Table 3) and propose how we
might use a poor vaccine, which has a large loss of protection
effectiveness, against the resistant strain to maximize the effects of
the program (Fig. 4, 5, and 6). For the results reported here, we
assumed that the vaccinated birds can perfectly protect the infection
from the vaccine-sensitive strain. Although that assumption is not
unreasonable [21], in Supplementary Information: Text S1, Fig.
S10, S11, we present an investigation of the effect of the loss of
protection effectiveness against the vaccine-sensitive strain. Qual-
itatively similar results were obtained using numerical simulations.
Vaccinationisnow beingusedextensivelytoaidtheprevention of
emergence or to control the spread of avian influenza [14].
However, if the vaccinations are not used appropriately, prevention
and control will be negatively affected by the vaccination program
[1,11,19,21,22]. Actually, when the vaccine-resistant strain emerg-
es, our model predicts various risks in the program. Therefore, to
eradicate the infectious disease effectively by vaccination, early
detection of the resistant strain, monitoring of its virulence and loss
of protection effectiveness of vaccination caused by the resistant
strain, and attendance of non-pharmaceutical interventions, in
addition to collaboration among farmers, industry, public health
authorities, and the government are all required.
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Figure 7. Time-course of the spread of the disease with
vaccination and non-pharmaceutical interventions: We calcu-
late epidemic curves with a vaccination program for 500 days.
The vaccination program and non-pharmaceutical intervention are
started after the vaccine-sensitive strain becomes endemic (around 200
days). We assume that the vaccine-resistant strain occurs after the start
of vaccination (around 260 days). The top, middle, and bottom figures
respectively depict time courses of infection without the vaccination
program, with only the vaccination program, and with both the
vaccination program and the non-pharmaceutical intervention. The
blue and red curves respectively represent the number of infected
individuals with vaccine-sensitive and vaccine-resistant strains. We
assume that the prevalence rate of vaccination program is p=0.5, the
loss of protection effectiveness is s=0.8.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004915.g007
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